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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: CaseNo.20040861-CA 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
v. 
JUSTIN WARREN BASS, (incarcerated) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
ARGUMENT 
The State argues that trial counsel for Bass invited the trial court's error in 
sending Bass to prison, because trial counsel initially conceded that the trial court 
had no authority to do otherwise if Bass were not accepted into a treatment 
program. State's brief at 7-8. 
The doctrine of invited error is designed to stop parties from taking one 
strategically advantageous position at trial, and then reversing that position on 
appeal in the event that the first strategy failed at trial. See, e.g., State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989). 
As a factual matter, the doctrine of invited error has no application here. 
While trial counsel initially erroneously conceded that the trial court would have no 
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discretion to sentence Bass to prison if he were not accepted into a treatment facility 
(R. 98 at 11), he later argued that the trial court should hold Bass in jail until a bed 
became available in a treatment center, in order to effectuate the legislative intent of 
the probation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5 (R. 89 at 4, 6). In his initial 
erroneous concession, trial counsel was not trying to obtain a favorable ruling from 
the trial court, but was making an erroneous and harmful concession. Once he 
recognized the proper favorable position for his client, he asked the trial court to 
adopt it prior to the ultimate ruling. He did not attempt to lead the court into error. 
As a legal matter, the invited error doctrine does not apply to block plain 
error analysis when there is no conceivable strategic basis for the party's error at 
trial, or when there is ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. 
The State cites the concurring opinion of Justice Zimmerman in Bullock for 
the proposition that parties should generally be bound by the conscious choices of 
their lawyers. State's brief at 8. The controlling majority opinion, in which Justice 
Zimmerman "fully concur [red]," id- at 160, clearly recognizes that even strategic 
choices of lawyers are reviewed for ineffective assistance. See Bullock, 791 P.2d at 
158-59. 
There was no strategic reason for trial counsel's initial erroneous concession, 
and Bass has asserted and justified the application for the plain error and ineffective 
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assistance of counsel doctrines in his opening brief. See Bass's opening brief at 16-
20. Accordingly, this Court should reject the State's invited error argument. 
The State attempts to refute the claim of ineffective assistance, arguing that 
Bass cannot show a reasonable probability of a different result, because the PSR did 
not contain a full analysis of the statutory prerequisites to probation, and because 
Bass cannot prove that the trial court would have granted him probation. State's 
brief at 9. 
As a legal matter, the shortcomings in the PSR analysis are an independent 
basis for reconsideration of Bass's sentence, see Bass's opening brief at 15-16, 
discussing State v. Hammond, 2001 UT 92, UH 22-25, 34 P.3d 773 (reversing and 
remanding for resentencing for, inter alia, failure of evaluator to consider central 
issues defined by § 76-5-406.5, the probation statute). The shortcomings in the 
evaluation do not decrease the possibility that the trial court would have granted 
and will grant Bass probation once the trial court understands its authority to do so. 
As a factual matter, Bass has established a reasonable probability that the 
trial court would have granted him probation in the absence of the errors, where the 
trial court expressly recognized that he did not have the power to sentence Bass to 
probation (R. 89 at 6, 12), and indicated that while he had to enforce the 
legislature's will in applying the plain terms of the statute, "it does appear to be a 
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topsy turvy world [.]" (R. 89 at 6-7). Particularly where the trial court was so 
appropriately intent on following the will of the legislature (R. 89 at 6-7), once the 
trial court is informed that sentencing Bass to probation and requiring the Fremont 
program to accept him is entirely consistent with the legislature's intent, there is a 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted, and will grant Bass 
probation. 
The State cites but does not quote or include in its addendum Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-406, and indicates that this statute emphasizes the narrowness of the 
probation statute. State's brief at 11 n.4. § 76-3-406 does not emphasize the 
narrowness of the probation statute, but defers to that statute.1 
176-3-406 provides: 
Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-201 and 77-18-1 and Title 77, Chapter 
16af e x c e p t as provided in Section 76-5-406.5, probation shall not 
be granted, the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, 
the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense, and 
hospitalization shall not be ordered, the effect of which would in any way 
shorten the prison sentence for any person who commits a capital felony or 
a first degree felony involving:(l) Section 76-5-202, aggravated murder;(2) 
Section 76-5-203, murder;(3) Section 76-5-301.1, child kidnapping;(4) 
Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping;(5) Section 76-5-402.1, 
rape of a child;(6) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child;(7) 
Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child;(8) Subsections 76-5-
404.1(4) and (5), aggravated sexual abuse of a child;(9) Section 
76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; or(l0) any attempt to commit a 
felony listed in Subsections (5), (6), and (7). 
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The State argues that interpreting the probation statute, this Court should 
consider the legislature's intent, as expressed by its plain language. State's brief at 
14-15. The State argues that interpreting the probation statute, this Court should 
consider the statute in its entirety. State's brief at 13. 
Mr. Bass could not agree more. Accordingly, in assessing the sentencing 
appeal, this Court should recognize that Mr. Bass's being sent to prison and being 
denied probation because he is not dangerous enough (e.g. R. 89 at 4, 9), violates 
the clearly expressed intentions of the legislature that those who do not present an 
immediate danger to the community if placed in a residential treatment program are 
among the very few sex offenders who receive probation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
406.50). 
The State argues that the intent of the probation statute is to protect children 
from convicted sex offenders. State's brief at 13-14. 
Mr. Bass could not agree more. Accordingly, in assessing the sentencing 
appeal, this Court should recognize that Mr. Bass's being sent to prison and being 
denied probation because he is not dangerous enough, and because Fremont wishes 
to reserve the residential treatment beds for more dangerous offenders being 
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paroled from the prison (e.g. R. 89 at 4, 9) flies in the face of the legislature's intent 
to protect children from convicted sex offenders. 
The State argues that the trial court has no jurisdiction to grant Bass 
probation and order him held in the jail until a bed becomes available at a 
residential treatment facility. State's brief at 15. The probation statute expressly 
recognizes the trial courts' authority to do just this. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
406.5(2) ("A term of incarceration of at least 90 days is to be served prior to 
treatment and continue until the time when bed space is available at a residential 
sexual abuse treatment center as provided under Subsection (3) and probation is to 
be imposed for up to a maximum often years."). 
The State argues that the judicial branch is barred by the doctrine of 
separation of powers from interfering with Corrections' allocation of its resources. 
State's brief at 15. 
It is an innate and appropriate function of a court to insure that government 
actors, regardless of their branch of origination, comply with the law in all contexts, 
including their use and allocation of our government resources. See, e.g., Skokos v. 
Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541-43 (Utah App. 1995) (discussing judicial duty to 
review the lawfulness of policies promulgated by legislative or executive branch 
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officers; reversing trial court ruling that complaint challenging city's handling of 
golf course revenues presented non-justifiable political questions). 
The State's authority, Rampton v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970), does 
not support the State's separation of powers argument. In Rampton, the court struck 
a statute under the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution, Article 
V § 1, because the statute granted members of the senate and house of 
representatives the power to appoint people to the board of education, and required 
legislative approval of people appointed to the board of education, and thus 
effectively gave the legislative branch control of the board, which performs an 
executive branch function. See id. at 383. 
Rampton thus exemplifies, and does nothing to limit, the courts' authority to 
insure that all government actors comply with the law. 
The State cites State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978), in support of 
its argument that Bass should be denied relief on appeal, because Bass did not 
prove that "no reasonable [person]" would have sentenced Bass as the trial court 
did. State's brief at 15-16. 
Gerrard is one of many Utah cases recognizing the trial court's significant 
discretion in sentencing criminal defendants. It is because the trial court 
underestimated its sentencing authority due to his misunderstanding the law which 
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governed his sentencing decision that this Court should reverse the trial court's 
sentence and remand this matter to the trial court in an opinion informing that court 
that it does have the authority to grant Bass probation. Compare, e.g., Hammond, 
2001 UT 92,1JU 16-20, 34 P.3d 773 (remanding for resentencing in part because 
trial court apparently misunderstood the governing law). Particularly where the 
evaluation which should have informed the trial court's sentencing decision failed 
to assess all of the necessary criteria, this Court should remand for resentencing, so 
that all proper procedures are complied with in the imposition of Bass's sentence. 
See id. at UH 22-25 (reversing and remanding for resentencing for, inter alia, 
failure of evaluator to consider central issues defined by § 76-5-406.5, the probation 
statute). 
Respectfully submitted this ay of October, 2005. 
rm^t 
Lapry-fcengf 
Attorney for Mr. Efass 
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